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INTERFACES
STRAW MEN AND OLD SAWS –
AN EVIDENCE-BASED RESPONSE
TO SY & TINKER’S CRITIQUE
OF ACCOUNTING HISTORY
Thomas N. Tyson
ST. JOHN FISHER COLLEGE

and
David Oldroyd
UNIVERSITY OF NEWCASTLE
Abstract: In a recent Accounting History article, Sy and Tinker (S&T)
[2005] critique accounting history for its support of “archivalism”
and empiricism in light of irrefutable arguments against these “antiquarian epistemes.” While tempted to lambaste S&T’s article as un
fettered social activism rather than evidence-based historical inquiry,
we focus instead on the more substantive questions S&T raise. We
initially summarize their essential arguments, although some of the
statements they make are contradictory in nature. We then discuss
fundamental issues and genuine challenges to accounting history
posed by the post-Kuhnian critique that S&T and others represent, as
well as the nature and purpose of historical enquiry. We reviewed the
accounting history journal articles published between 2001 and 2005
and use our findings to evaluate the broad assertions that S&T make
about accounting history. We conclude that S&T’s critique is unwarranted and unjust, especially when the subject matter of the most
recent accounting history articles is considered.

INTRODUCTION: SY AND TINKER ASSERTIONS
Sy and Tinker (S&T) contend that Thomas Kuhn’s work on
the construction of theory in the natural sciences has created
a seismic historiographic shift that has not been acknowledged
by accounting historians, whom they characterize as “archivalists” because of their unwavering belief that historical data
Acknowledgments: We want to acknowledge Christopher Napier specifically
for his helpful comments and suggestions as discussant of our paper at the 2006
IPA Conference in Cardiff, Wales. We also acknowledge an unnamed reviewer for
helpful insights on Thomas Kuhn’s writings and the nature of the Kuhn/Popper
debate.
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are capable of objective verification. According to S&T, Kuhn
[1970] has proven that empiricism is defunct, notwithstanding
that the frauds S&T cite as proof of history’s inherent fallibility were themselves refuted by evidence, and that the historical
materialism that they promote as an alternative to archivalism
also requires evidence before one can accept it as an historical
explanation of social conditioning.
S&T also allege that the Kuhnian revolution has been successful among scientists and non-accounting historians alike,
and that by basing their conclusions on ineffectual methodologies (i.e., historical evidence and the principle of falsification),
accounting historians are in a serious state of denial. S&T
describe this alleged widespread acceptance of the fallibility of
empirical research as the “triumph of history over philosophy,”
although they also criticize accounting historians for not engaging with philosophy in the first place. Furthermore, accounting
historians continue to address the wrong issues (i.e., the great,
white, Eurocentric men of the past), and most importantly, do
not embrace an unequivocal moral stance vis-à-vis their subject
matter. For example, S&T [2005, p. 53] write:
Specifically, we provide a series of examples to remind
the reader of the vulnerability of Empirical Science to
ideological partisanship; not only in establishing the
verity of some ideas, but also in demonstrating the falsity of others. The implication is not merely about distortions of the truth, but more importantly, the need for
greater social self-awareness by accounting historians,
such that they systematically grasp the terrain in conflict situations, and make an informed but inescapable
choice about which side to ally their history. Such an
[sic] socio-historical episteme is diametrically opposite
to the philosophically naïve objectivity that under-girds
much archival research.
S&T similarly contend that by focusing on the wrong issues,
accounting historians have ignored the repressed voices and
social conflicts of the past, the inference being that when they
have taken sides, they have allied with the wrong party. As a result, S&T argue, conservative viewpoints dominate the academy,
and those with a more progressive spirit have been unable or are
unwilling to use the history of accounting to help liberate the
world of the present.
S&T infer that a belief in the inherent objectivity of fac

See Sy and Tinker [2006] for a more detailed discussion of Eurocentricism.
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tual evidence is the cause of accounting history’s misplaced allegiances. Although they do not explain why specifically, one must
presume it is because historical truths for post-Kuhnians are
always relative to a particular time and place. Following Kuhn,
this is the time and place where the historian is situated since
Kuhn is writing about the manner in which the dominant scientific paradigm of the day colors the choice of topic and interpretation of evidence [S&T, 2006]. This would, for instance, help explain the Eurocentric nature of accounting history as well as its
male gender bias and what S&T regard as an obsession with the
great persons of the past and double-entry bookkeeping. Hence,
S&T [2005, p. 49] argue that “any assertion as to the verity of a
statement of fact…requires a philosophical warrant.” Any definitive statement about the past is entirely unsustainable because it
derives from an historian’s epistemic, empirical selection of particular factoids among a set of competing evidential data. Thus,
while accounting historians would like to consider themselves
to be even-handed, they are unable to replicate an objective past
due to the inherent bias and subjectivity of their search and discovery process.
Given this unavoidable bias, S&T contend that accounting
history would be better served if accounting historians adopt an
unequivocal moral stance vis-à-vis their particular historical episode. Thus, they should examine the context and conflict associated with the episode (S&T’s emphasis on conflict is presumably
a reflection of the importance of class conflict in Marxist history), evaluate the arguments of the combatants, and openly promote the socially responsible position. According to S&T [2005,
p. 53], a failure to advocate is not only a missed opportunity for
accounting history, it has “undermined its authority to address
pressing problems in accounting practice and theory today.”
S&T are equally fervent about the outcome of Kuhn/Popper
debates concerning the philosophy of history. These debates
have incorporated the relationship between evidence and reality,
the inability of competing theorists to communicate with one
another, and the nature of scientific observation, explanation,
and prediction. S&T collapse the debates to “the meaning of
truth,” and extend Popper’s falsification (refutation) theory to
the work that historians undertake. For example, S&T [2005, p.
51] write:
Refutation itself was also a flawed project for the historians. Their criticisms focused on the tenuous link
between Theory and Reality. Ascertaining the meaning
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of empirical observations is always problematic. Observations are invariably mediated by senses and measuring instruments, and therefore all results are contingent
ontwo theories –, not one – the primary theory of interest, and a second (measurement) theory about how a
mediating device operates.
The implication is that we can “never be certain” to have refuted
a primary theory given that our “observation theory may be
faulty” [S&T, 2005, p. 52], even though, as Bryer [2006, p. 552]
has pointed out, such a dichotomy does not accord with Kuhn’s
[1970, pp. 10-11] own view that “law, theory, application, and
instrumentation” – “what questions may legitimately be asked….
and what techniques employed in seeking solutions” [Kuhn,
1970, p. 5] – cannot be separated.
Thus for S&T, perception trumps reality every time, a
view which directly links Kuhn’s historical relativism to Marx’s
historical materialism. Historical materialism alleges that the
social existence of men, which is in turn a product of the material  conditions in which they live, determines their whole consciousness, their ideas, and the way they see the world. Historians following an historical materialist approach would therefore
be a) very aware of the social context of the time; b) recognize
that their own ideas are also social constructions; and c) since
all ideas are social constructions, accept there is no point in attempting to remain neutral. According to Marwick [2002, p. 4],
“Marx criticized the philosophers for seeking to understand the
world, when, he declared, the problem was to ‘change it’.”
S&T advance historical materialism as a far better modus
operandi for accounting history than the accounting “archi
valism” they disparage. In essence, S&T call for historians to
throw away the scale, choose sides, and enter the fray, presum
ably on the side of the vanquished, impoverished, and socially
repressed that accounting history has, allegedly, hitherto ignored, rather than to continue their support of white-male,
Eurocentric propertied interests – the purported subject of
mainstream accounting history.

Although S&T never specifically define the word “archivalism,” they seem to
equate it to “empiricism,” a word that signifies the primacy of evidence in validating or refuting a particular theory.

S&T [2005, p. 47] speak thusly about mainstream accounting history: “Despite the Kuhnian Revolution, archival antiquarianism reigns supreme. This regime survives in a North-Korean-like insularity, by combining a self-referential
closure using the Great Men of accounting with a refusal to engage a broader
literature in social history.”
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Unfortunately, S&T do not provide criteria that would help
historians (or the subjects of the historical inquiry) make the
correct choice when the distinctions between good and evil are
not self-evident nor do they provide specific examples of where
accounting historians have made the wrong choice. Instead,
they generally argue that the historian “should align herself with
the side judged to be morally and socially appropriate” [S&T,
2005, p. 49].
In the second part of their paper, S&T describe the historical frauds that were perpetrated by Copernicus and the hoaxers
who created the Piltdown Man, examples they would surely
acknowledge are quite far afield from the domain of accounting history. S&T describe and then critique these episodes as
examples which show the limitations of historical evidence.
Fraud is a poor yardstick for judging whether history is capable
of objective verification, given that subjectivity in history usually
arises not through manipulating the evidence but through
conflicts of interpretation. S&T conclude by calling for accounting historians to produce “relevant history” by addressing the
moral quandaries of the present, such that history “becomes an
emancipatory exercise, where knowledge of the past becomes
an instrument of edification and ennoblement; not subjugation”
[S&T, 2005, p. 63].
In the balance of our paper, we briefly summarize the Kuhn/
Popper debate and conclude that if the Kuhnian revolution
“reigns supreme,” there are insurgents outside of accounting archivalism that continue to contest the outcome. We next identify
the substantive questions that underlie historical research rather
than the social advocacy that S&T propound. We then review
and categorize accounting history journal publications during
the 2001-2005 period. We conclude with an evidence-based assessment of S&T’s assertions as well as the state of current accounting history research.
THE KUHN/POPPER DEBATE
While S&T portray the debate between Kuhn and Popper
as a clear victory for Kuhnian devotees, the outcome appears
far less decisive. Kuhnian and post-Kuhnian (post-positivist)
supporters argue that competing paradigms are incommensurable and cannot be refuted on the basis of evidence each
party amasses. This occurs because each paradigm’s supporters
would present only that evidence which bolsters their particular
perspective, leaving them incapable of disproving the verity
Published by eGrove, 2007
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presented by the other side. Consequently, paradigms cannot be
refuted on the basis of evidence, which to S&T indicates that 1)
the concept of absolute truth can never be established, and 2)
that absolute truth cannot therefore exist. Absent the ability to
establish absolute truth, S&T [2005, p. 49] argue that “partisanship in history is inescapable.”
Harris [1992, p. 89] acknowledges that the denial of truth,
or at least this interpretation of Kuhn’s thinking, “leads directly to a radical relativism with all of attending difficulties.”
However, Harris [1992, p. 166] proposes a different solution to
resolve intellectual debates, one that most archival historians
would readily embrace:
If anything is ever to resolve the dispute between competing theories it will be by the accumulation of more
data through experiments by more researchers over a
longer period of time.
Laudan [1996, p. 5] similarly characterizes Kuhn, Feyerabend, and other post-positivists as “thoroughgoing relativists”
who are committed to three overriding principles:
(1) that evidence radically underdetermines theory
choice – to the extent that virtually any theory can be
rationally retained in the face of any conceivable evidence (epistemic relativism); (2) that the standards for
theory evaluation are mere conventions, reflecting no
facts of the matter (metamethodological relativism); and
(3) that one conceptual framework or worldview cannot
be made intelligible in the language of a rival (linguistic
relativism).
Unlike S&T [2005, pp. 47, 49), who disdain accounting history
“as soldiering under impoverished Archivalism,” and promote
“the triumph of Kuhnian and Post-Kuhnian History over Philosophy,” Laudan [1996, p. 5] views post-positivism as:
…an intellectual failure. The arguments on its behalf
are dubious and question-begging. Still worse, it has
sustained virtually no positive program of research...
and that it now teeters on the brink of conceptual

bankruptcy.

Marwick [2002, p. 5], the founding professor of history at
the Open University, is similarly unequivocal in his refutation of
the impact of Kuhnian principles on both scientific and historical research:
Working historians, and working scientists, have genhttps://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol34/iss1/10
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erally been too busy to philosophize about their subjects. Au royaume des aveugles les borgnes sont rois...In
science, a conspicuous example is T.H. Kuhn, whose
fine-sounding thesis about the succession of culturally
determined scientific ‘paradigms’ dictating the topics of
research departs from the facts of scientific discovery.
Historians and scientists have tended to pay lip-service
to these ‘kings’ before, usually, ignoring their theories
and carrying on as before.
Clearly, there is ongoing debate regarding the influence of
Kuhnian and post-Kuhnian principles on both scientific and historical research. There is also controversy regarding what Kuhn
actually meant by the term “incommensurability.” Bird [2000, p.
264] contends that “the central element in Kuhn’s epistemological outlook is his neutralism about truth” rather than a deniability of truth, as S&T, Feyerabend, and other post-Kuhnians infer.
For example, Kuhn [1970, pp. 4-5] did not maintain that the
incommensurability of competing paradigms in science prevents
“effective research.” Instead, he regarded the existence of “a set
of received beliefs” about the natural world as a precondition for
its progress. In the first place, it is the belief-set that will set the
agenda about which questions to ask. Second, the unexplained
anomalies thrown up by these questions will eventually become
so compelling as to produce a paradigm shift (“revolution”
in science). Thus, for Kuhn [1970, pp. 52-53], progress in the
natural sciences is not driven by debates about “the objectives
and methods of research,” but by revolutionary transformations
in generally accepted conceptions, which are themselves the
product of more research [Bryer, 1998, p. 670]. Indeed, one of
the characteristics of a paradigm is that it should be “sufficiently
open-ended to leave all sorts of problems” for its adherents to
resolve, making use of the “rules and standards for scientific
practice” to which they are “committed” [Kuhn, 1970, pp. 1011]. Kuhn was not, therefore, the “thoroughgoing relativist” that
S&T portray. Instead, he regarded “factual and theoretical novelty” as being “closely...intertwined in scientific discovery” [Kuhn,
1970, p. 53]. It follows that progress in science is not simply an
abstraction, a realization which, according to Bryer [1998, p.
691], offers hope for progress in other disciplines, including accounting history:
Thus, from Kuhn’s point of view, progress in building a community of historians of accounting depends
upon recognition of the competing conceptions of the
subject-matter, and a debate in which anomalies are
Published by eGrove, 2007
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highlighted and resolved by recourse to imagination, to
logic, and to the facts.
In fairness to S&T, we acknowledge that the citations (i.e.,
“evidence”) we have gathered support our point of view; however, unlike S&T, we believe the Kuhnian “revolution” is indeterminate and that neither relativists nor positivists should claim
victory. We also recognize that it is often courageous and ennobling to take a strong moral stance, especially when it refutes
the position of those holding both the power and the purse. Notwithstanding, we respect mainstream historians who attempt to
be dispassionate about their depiction of past events, especially
when they identify competing interpretations of their evidence.
For example, one of this article’s authors engaged in a series of
heated debates regarding the purpose and nature of accounting
at the Springfield Armory and New England textile mills in the
early and mid-1800s [Hoskin & Macve, 1988a, b, 1994, 1996;
2000; Tyson, 1990; 1993; 1995; 1998]. We argued back and forth,
even though each held different world views and wrote from different “paradigms.” We strongly disagreed on the interpretation
of the evidence, but that is something which scholarly folks do
all the time. Thus, while the clashes were intense, at least on an
intellectual level, we never argued about the inherent inability of
evidence to bolster our respective positions.
To put these debates another way, historians generally accept that history is subjective to some degree, and that historical progress (i.e., greater understanding about the past) is best
achieved through dialogue. In point of fact, post-Kuhnians like
S&T rarely provide evidence by which a reader can evaluate the
strength of their truth claims. Absent evidence, their persuasiveness hinges on the passion of their appeal and the logic of their
argument, something we tackle head on in the next section of
the paper.
THE NATURE OF HISTORICAL RESEARCH
We believe that there are fundamental differences between
historical inquiry and social activism. Unlike social activists,

Laudan [1996, p. 9] concludes the concept of incommensurability which
underlies Kuhnian and post-Kuhnian thinking has never been systematically
evaluated in a way that could lead to the triumph S&T promote: “From the beginning of its vogue in the early 1960s, incommensurability has been a philosophical
conundrum in search of instantiation. Neither Kuhn nor Feyerabend, its most
prominent early advocates, presents any evidence that natural scientists on opposite sides of a theoretical fence systematically failed to understand one another,
as the thesis of incommensurability requires.”

https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol34/iss1/10
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who seek to build a “better” (i.e., more equitable, honorable,
humane, etc.) world, historians simply want to understand
what happened in the past, why things happened as they did,
and perhaps to help explain the present and predict the future, given that past events may serve as prologue in certain
circumstances. To obtain their knowledge, historians examine
primary documents that were, ideally, created by participants
in past events (i.e., memoranda, journals, personal letters, or
other first-hand accounts) and/or, secondarily, by contemporary
observers of these events (newspaper reports, business records,
etc.). In either case, documents form the core of an historian’s
understanding and the basis for interpretations. As Evans [1999,
p. 69] writes, “what is at issue, therefore, is how historians use
documents not to establish discrete facts, but as evidence for
establishing the larger patterns that connect them.”
Most historians readily concede that while there may be
consensus that particular events played out in a particular fashion, there is rarely a single interpretation that explains why the
event occurred or its impact and implications. Again, we fully
concur with Evans [1999, p. 72] regarding the use and interpretation of historical documents in arriving at our conclusions
regarding these issues:
Documents can be read in a variety of ways, all of them,
theoretically at least, equally valid. Moreover, it is obvious that our way of reading a source derives principally
from our present-day concerns and from questions that
present-day theories and ideas lead us to formulate. Nor
is there anything wrong in this.
The difficulty we have with S&T and other social activists is
their unabashed intolerance for conventional historical inquiry.
This intolerance compels them to reject all efforts that seek a
greater understanding of the past, for its own sake. For example,
S&T argue that scholars have an inherent social agenda that
drives their search for supporting historical evidence. Accordingly, this evidence is necessarily biased and, thus, its only use
is to buttress socially appropriate agendas. Most practicing
historians would probably reject this position out-of-hand and
be inclined to support Ginzburg’s [1991, p. 83] views concerning
the use and interpretation of evidence:
The historian is thus confronted with various possibilities: a document can be a fake; a document can be
authentic, but unreliable, insofar as the information it
provides can be either lies or mistakes; or a document
Published by eGrove, 2007
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can be authentic and reliable. In the first two cases the
evidence is dismissed; in the latter, it is accepted, but
only as evidence of something else. In other words, the
evidence is not regarded as a historical document in itself, but as a transparent medium – as an open window
that gives us direct access to reality.
As far as accounting history goes, there has been some recognition in the literature of the challenge to ascribing meanings
posed by postmodernism, with truth acknowledged as a question
of interpretation, in turn depending on the language we have at
our disposal for describing it. The emphasis in postmodernist
literature on meaning in financial reporting as a reflexive construct of social processes rather than as something containing
objective reality [Hines, 1988, 1991] is a case in point. Thus, it is
argued there is no such thing as faithfully representing economic reality in accounts. What we are in fact representing is the
accountant’s view of reality which is determined by their prior
training and beliefs. In this scheme, meaning is constrained by
language as this is the medium through which meaning is both
expressed and understood. Hence, the Foucauldian view of history is that of a series of “discursive formations” [Hopwood,
1987, p. 230; Armstrong, 1994, pp. 28-29], as Miller and Napier
[1993, p. 633] discuss:
We emphasize the discursive nature of calculation. We
attend to all those diverse ways in which meaning and
significance is attributed to particular ways of calculating. We are referring here to the language and vocabulary in which a particular practice is articulated, the
ideals attached to certain calculative technologies, and
the rationales that set out the aims and aspirations of
various authorities.
The emphasis is on discursive formations rather than historical events precisely because meanings are acknowledged as
contingent on the ways in which knowledge is interpreted and
communicated. However, the problem we have with this notion is that careful attention to the singularity of such meanings
does not allow the historian to subsume events into generalizations, and generalizations into theory. As a result, this aspect of
Foucauldianism has tended to be rejected as accounting history
has become more theoretical in recent years. If knowledge can
only be interpreted in the context of particular situations, it is
not possible to generalize causal relationships which are the essence of theory construction.
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol34/iss1/10
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To get around this dilemma, Robson [1991], for instance,
introduces the general concept of “translation” into his history
of the genesis of accounting standards in the U.K., allowing him
to sidestep what Armstrong [1994, p. 35] described as the lack of
“dynamism” in Foucauldianism as a theoretical explanation of
accounting change. Thus, Robson argues that accounting change
can be understood as a “process” whereby “particular accounting statements, calculations and techniques” are translated into
“wider social, economic and political discourses,” which in turn
“suggest new problems and priorities for accounting practices
and stimulate the process of accounting change” [Robson, 1991,
p. 566]. Ezzamel and Hoskin [2002, pp. 340-341] do something
similar while exploring the relationship between accounting,
writing, and money. They argue that the whole history of money
can be understood as a general process of “supplementarity,” in
which successively more complex forms of money are created
(i.e., coinage, bills of exchange, endorsed discounted notes, etc.)
that enhance its “operation and power” in society [Ezzamel and
Hoskin, 2002, p. 361].
There would appear to be a tension in accounting historiography, therefore, over the desire to use history to construct
theory in a post-modern world that stresses the relativity of
meanings. Whether theoretical history is tenable is debatable
given the unpredictability of historical events [Oldroyd, 1999].
Nevertheless, theoretical perspectives on accounting history
have gained ascendancy precisely to avoid the criticism of “antiquarianism” leveled at it by S&T. In particular, there has been a
willingness to engage with other disciplines which is the rationale of the interdisciplinary perspectives on accounting movement [Miller et al., 1991]. And to their credit, most theoretical
historians recognize the need to ground their theory in archival
evidence. Bryer is a case in point. Having first spent many years
developing his theory regarding the transition to capitalism, he
is now seeking to validate it through archival research [Bryer,
2005, 2006a, b; Bryer et al., 2005].
Indeed, to accept S&T’s view that the past is essentially
unknowable in any objective sense, and that it is not therefore
worth trying to be objective, robs history of its intellectual imperative of trying to uncover and explain past events, and entails
disengaging from the discipline. This can be illustrated by the
debate over the existence of an ancient matriarchy. Here, matriarchal study groups outside mainstream academic research
have alienated themselves from academic prehistorians, including most feminists, through their rejection of the historical
Published by eGrove, 2007
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 rocesses of gathering and evaluating evidence. Instead, they
p
follow the type of social advocacy promoted by S&T in discovering an anti-evidentially based past in which empathy and connectedness with their female ancestors assumes priority. The
point becomes to show modern women how much they are repressed, that this was not always the case, and that a better way
is therefore possible. But it ceases to be history [Oldroyd, 2004].
Finally, as scholars who are more concerned with accounting history than with the theory of history, we believe that
knowledge about the past, accounting or otherwise, must be
based on both dialogue and knowledge. Furthermore, we believe
that the growth in knowledge derives from new evidence or
the reinterpretation of existing evidence that often comes from
historical inquiry as well as social advocacy and other forms
of intellectual activity. S&T unequivocally disparaged current
accounting history research in their recent article. The next section of this paper reviews several dimensions of their inquiry to
see if S&T’s claims hold up.
REVIEW OF RECENT ACCOUNTING
HISTORY JOURNAL ARTICLES
We decided to review the main articles that appeared in
three peer-reviewed journals that specialize in accounting history – Accounting Historians Journal (AHJ), Accounting History
(AH), and Accounting, Business & Financial History (ABFH). We
limited our examination to the five-year period 2001-2005 and
acknowledge that earlier or longer periods could provide different results. We included “Interface” articles in AHJ and special
issue articles that appeared in all three journals. We excluded
ABFH articles that focus on banking, insurance, valuation, and
other aspects of business history that are, in our view, only tangentially related to accounting history. We also excluded articles
that are described as comments, responses, editorials, book
reviews, conference reports, or commissioned works. As a result
of these filters, we reviewed the abstracts of 176 articles that
were published in the five-year period of study and categorized
them according to five criteria – topic area(s), methodology, time
focus, geographic focus, and eclecticism.
Clearly, the most difficult and subjective aspect of our rubric

We recognize that other journals publish articles on accounting history
(AAAJ, Abacus, ABR, etc.), but these journals do not specialize in accounting history. Omitting these journals enabled us to distinguish accounting history articles
more easily from other accounting-related or business history articles.
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has been to identify the primary topic area and methodology
of an article. To do so, one author initially and independently
established a possible breakdown of topic areas. The final
breakdown was then revised through dialogue with the other
author. Where we could not agree on a primary classification,
we chose to place the article in a second or even third category
area as needed. We had far less difficulty in determining an
article’s primary time and geographic focus, although creating
time boundaries between periods was problematic. For these
two categories, one of the authors reviewed each abstract, made
the assignment, and consulted with the other author to resolve
uncertainties.
The last category, eclecticism, is included in order to illustrate the gender and affiliation of the authors of current accounting history publications, as well as to determine if these
authors have in fact “avoided engaging this wider literature and
maintained...a revivalist preoccupation with ‘The Great Men’
of accounting” [S&T, 2005, p. 49]. The ratio of non-accounting
citations to total citations for each article serves as a surrogate
measure of the extent to which accounting historians engage in
the wider literature. Each article was assigned to one of four
categories in terms of its citations to non-accounting sources –
greater than 75%, 50 to 75%, 25-50%, and less than 25%. Finally,
we computed the percentage of articles authored or co-authored
by females and those written by scholars with non-U.S. affiliations as measures of eclecticism or diversity.
STRAW MEN AND OLD SAWS
In this section, we use the evidence derived from our review
of the literature to identify the straw men and old saws that S&T

We acknowledge that our classification scheme is artificial and arbitrary.
That said, our purpose was to organize the journal literature in a way that helped
us evaluate S&T’s claims and generalizations about accounting history literature.

A citation was considered an “accounting” citation if it included the words
“accounting,” “account,” “financial,” or “tax” in the title of the citation or publication, or if the journal or book was clearly an accounting journal (i.e., Abacus). In
addition, if the author of the citation was known to be an accounting academic,
the citation was treated as accounting even if it did not include any of the key
words noted above. Finally, the total number of articles was reduced to 166 for
this part of the study because the authors could not clearly determine if the citation was accounting or non-accounting because of language in four articles. Our
intent is to err was on the side of conservatism (i.e., not to overstate the percentage of non-accounting citations).

We contacted each journal’s editor to clarify our uncertainties in determining an author’s gender, given our unfamiliarity with non-Western first names.
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conjure up in their assault on accounting history. Our intent
is not simply to refute S&T’s contentions but rather to paint a
more accurate picture of the domain of current accounting history research. We discern a pattern of faulty reasoning in the
majority of S&T’s claims, many of which include at least one irrelevant premise as a basis for presenting an opposing position.
According to Damer [1987, p. 128]:
This fallacy consists in misrepresenting an opponent’s
point of view or argument, usually for the purpose of
making it easier to attack. There are several different
ways in which one may misrepresent an opponent’s
argument or position. First, one may state it in a perverted form by utilizing only a part of it, by paraphrasing it in carefully chosen misleading words, or by subtly
including one’s own evaluation or commentary in it.
Second, one may oversimplify it…Third, one may extend the argument beyond its original bounds by drawing inferences from it that are clearly unwarranted or
unintended.
We illustrate below instances where S&T present false
or, more generously, naïve premises in the manner Damer describes. We initially replicate S&T’s comments and then briefly
describe the fallacy and our findings in bold italics. We base our
responses, in part, on our analysis of accounting history journal
articles during the 2001-2005 period. We present our conclusions and welcome S&T’s rejoinder if we have misrepresented,
misinterpreted, or otherwise inaccurately captured their sentiments.
1.

“Despite the Kuhnian Revolution, archival antiquarianism
reigns supreme....Accounting history’s resolute adherence to
empiricist, archival, and otherwise antiquarian epistemes...”
[S&T, 2005, pp. 47, 49].
While accounting historians continue to prioritize archival-based studies, as do most historians, a number of recent articles can be assigned to a number of more modern
and critical categories, including race, culture, and theorizing. In our view, the range of topics and methodologies
challenges S&T’s conclusion that “antiquarianism reigns
supreme.”

2.

“This paper redresses the balance in two ways: First, by using Kuhn’s critique to show archivalist empiricism as incapable of proving a paradigm’s truth...” [S&T, 2005, p. 47].
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We read and reread S&T’s article and are unconvinced
that it and Kuhn’s critique clearly demonstrate that “archivalist empiricism is incapable of proving a paradigm’s
truth.” Most accounting historians accept the subjectivity of historical truth, but this does not mean that truth
does not exist or that it is not worth looking for. After all,
events do happen (unless we are dreaming) and for a reason, even if it is an accident.
3.

“Accounting history has avoided engaging in this wider literature and maintained a methodological naivety, by excessive
internal self-referencing, an over-dependence on influential
editorial oracles, and a revivalist preoccupation with ‘The
Great Men’ of accounting” [S&T, 2005, p. 49].
We discovered that only 13 articles out of the 176 articles reviewed are biographical, and only three of these
appeared in the last two years of the period – hardly “a
revivalist preoccupation with ‘The Great Men’ of accounting.” Indeed, articles on Pacioli and Littleton, the
two “great men” identified by S&T are notable by their
absence. We also found that over 40% of the articles have
more than 50% of their citations from non-accounting
sources. In our view, the data indicate that many accounting historians are actively engaging in the “wider
literature.”

4.

“…progressive forms of accounting history have taken a
back seat to conservative renditions on the subject” [S&T,
2005, p. 49].
Our review of the 2001-2005 accounting history literature
revealed a wide range of primary topic areas including
race and gender. In addition, over 30% of the 176 articles
included one or more female authors and nearly 70% included one or more non-U.S.- based authors. These data
suggest that recent accounting history articles published
during the 2001-2005 period are not “conservative” in
that they neither focus exclusively on Eurocentric topics
nor are they written exclusively by white, Anglo/Eurocentric, male authors.

5.

“We conclude that the triumph of Kuhnian and PostKuhnian History over Philosophy is a success that has been
celebrated everywhere in history except in accounting”
[S&T, 2005, p. 49].
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As we argued in the earlier narrative, the “triumph” is
clearly not celebrated as widely as S&T would suggest.
6.

“It is arrogant and self-serving to claim that accounting history is exempt from philosophical scrutiny and pretensions”
[S&T, 2005, p. 49].
None of the 176 accounting history article abstracts we
reviewed appeared “arrogant and self-serving,” and we
challenge S&T to identify one article that makes this
claim explicitly.

7.

“Nor can archivalism get off the hook by claiming it is prephilosophical…” [S&T, 2005, p. 50].
We again challenge S&T to identify any one of the 176 accounting history articles that make this claim about its
subject matter.

8.

“…while some histories purport to be sensitive to context
and times, such sensitivity is frequently skin-deep” [S&T,
2005, p. 50].
The wide range of articles and the extensive use of nonaccounting source materials suggests that accounting
history authors are paying a great deal of attention to
context and times.

9.

“This is a missed opportunity of tragic proportions for accounting historical research because it has undermined its
authority to address pressing problems in accounting practice and theory today” [S&T, 2005, pp. 52-53].
We do not believe accounting historians have the authority or are they well situated “to address problems in
practice and theory today.” That undertaking is better left
to social activists, contemporary critics, and accounting
regulators. Rather, historians should continue to examine, illuminate, and interpret the past.
SUMMARY, DISCUSSION, AND CONCLUSIONS

In general, most historians accept that history is subjective
to some degree, and that historical progress (i.e., greater understanding about the past) is best achieved through dialogue.
Therefore, each historical study constitutes but one cell of the
wider organism that is always growing and developing. This is
one reason for the frequently observed phenomenon of each
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol34/iss1/10
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generation rewriting its own history. It is not just new historians
reinterpreting the past because their own social conditioning
is different to that of their predecessors. It is because history is
essentially about discussion fueled by the examination of new
evidence, which in turn prompts re-examination of the old.
Sometimes the evidence makes us change our minds. Indeed,
this concept of progress in history through the interrogation and
re-interrogation of evidence is not so far removed from Kuhn’s
[1970, pp. 52-53] ideas regarding progress in science. As we have
seen, Kuhn maintained that discoveries in science occur when
the anomalies uncovered by research under a particular paradigm become so great that they induce paradigm change. The
main difference in the models, therefore, lies in the pattern of
change. With Kuhn, these shifts in science occur in steps rather
than continuously. Most historians, however, are inherently
aware of the contingent nature of their investigations. Thus, we
agree with Evans [1999, p. 90] regarding how post-modern and
other critics of history have made the use of evidence so problematic:
It did not take the advent of postmodernism to point
this out. But what postmodernists have done is to push
such familiar arguments about the transparency or
opacity of historical texts and sources out to a set of binary opposites and polarized extremes. Historians have
always understood that they must scrutinize documents
and evidence carefully. The language of historical documents is never transparent, and historians have always
been aware that they cannot simply gaze through it to
the historical reality behind. Historians know, historians have always known, that we can see the past only
‘through a glass, darkly.’
Probably the prime example of constructive dialogue in
accounting history concerns the role of cost and management
accounting in the British industrial revolution. Historians have
moved (and are moving) through different stages where initially
people like Solomons [1952], basing their history on management accounting textbooks, saw useful management accounting
as originating in the U.S. in the later 19th century, to one where
the likes of Fleischman and Parker [1991, 1992; see also, Fleisch
man and Tyson, 1993] and Boyns and Edwards [1996 n.b., 1997;
see also, Edwards, 1989; Edwards and Newell, 1991], who look
at the records themselves, have successfully championed the
utility of earlier British industrial accounts to the extent that
previous opponents, such as Hoskin and Macve [2000], now
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accept as useful to entrepreneurs, notwithstanding their deficiencies in terms of labor control. And so the debate continues,
but without evidence the discussions would become stifled and
essentially rhetorical.
In terms of the triumph of the Kuhnian revolution, which
S&T promote so passionately, we wonder whether Kuhn really
has much to say about history at all. Kuhn’s arguments were directed to the natural sciences, and his debates with Popper centered on experimental data. For example, Marwick [2002, p. 11]
identifies several fundamental differences between history and
the natural sciences which bring into question the applicability
of S&T’s assertions about accounting history:
Another aspect about the autonomy of history is the differences which undoubtedly exist between history and
the natural sciences. The relationships studied by historians are not basically mathematical in the way that
those in the sciences are. Obviously, the subject matter studied is very different; history inevitably involves
questions of human values, human emotions, human
motivations. Historians do not conduct experiments.
Scientists work within a framework of theories, which
are taken as valid until positively disproved.
Thus, it appears to us that Kuhn’s followers like Feyerabend
[1975] and S&T, rather than Kuhn himself, have sought to
extend Kuhn’s arguments to history and other social sciences.
There are many pertinent and contentious issues concerning
the practice of history that surround the nature of evidence,
but placing the writings of Kuhn at the center of these discussions appears unwarranted. While social activists like S&T may
continue to prioritize the conflict between relativism and objectivity, historians have moved on and recognize that the most
interesting historical questions center on the interpretation of
past events, not on the evidence which attests to the existence of
these events.
Although we strongly disagree with S&T’s comments about
accounting history per se, we acknowledge that the vast majority of articles published during the 2001-2005 period within the
three specialist, English language, accounting history journals
were written by scholars from the western tradition (U.S.,
U.K., Australasia, and Europe) and address issues in the postVictorian period (1830-present). Thus, S&T are on firmer ground
when they focus their critique on accounting history’s preoccupation with Eurocentric issues, which they have done in a more
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recent article [S&T, 2006], notwithstanding the long-standing
Japanese tradition in this area. However, part of the problem
here is one of communication rather than of the work not being
carried out, with studies being published in different languages,
and by historians outside the accounting academy. Language
has been a problem for European scholars, as well as nonEuropeans [Carmona, 2004], and journal editors have responded
with special issues dedicated to particular geographic locations.
The intercontinental World Congresses of Accounting Historians
and the Accounting History International Conferences have also
been significant in breaking down communication barriers, widening the field of accounting history research. In actual fact, the
subject matter of the three English language journals dedicated
to accounting history appears to be quite broad with significant
space devoted to non-western topics, often through the vehicle
of special issues. In conclusion, our review and analysis of the
2001-2005 accounting history journal literature reveals a vital, active sub-discipline, one that is capable of change with a
healthy eclecticism of topic, method, time, and place.
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